Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

2015

Systemic Corruption in an Advanced Welfare State:
Lessons from the Québec Charbonneau Inquiry
Denis Saint-Martin

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Saint-Martin, Denis, "Systemic Corruption in an Advanced Welfare State: Lessons from the Québec Charbonneau Inquiry" (2015).
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 115.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/115

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 39
Vol. 11/ Issue. 08/ (2015)

Systemic Corruption in an Advanced Welfare State: Lessons from the
Québec Charbonneau Inquiry
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 53(1), Forthcoming.
Denis St-Martin
Abstract:
The Quiet Revolution in the 1960s propelled the province of Québec onto the path of
greater social justice and better government. But as the evidence exposed at the
Charbonneau inquiry makes clear, this did not make systemic corruption disappear from
the construction sector. Rather, it adapted to its new institutional environment and was
significantly shaped by the incentives structure it provided. The patterns of corruption
emerging from the Charbonneau inquiry bear the imprint of the so-called “Québec model”
inherited from the Quiet Revolution in at least three ways: (i) in the economic nationalism
that made public policies partial towards French-speaking and Québec-based businesses,
notably in the engineering sector, with major firms like SNC-Lavalin using their dominant
position as “national champions” to engage in cartel-like practices to raise the price of
construction projects; (ii) in the Jacobinism that strongly centralized power at the
provincial level and left municipalities underdeveloped in terms of bureaucratic capacity,
thus making them easy prey for corrupted interests, and (iii) in the sovereignist/federalist
cleavage that, since the 1970s, has made Québec businesses dependent on the Liberal Party
for political stability and has allowed party operators to extract a rent from businesses in
return.
Keywords:
Systemic corruption, institutional change, culturalism, Quiet Revolution, new institutional
economics, functionalism, social partnership, varieties of capitalism, embeddedness,
economic nationalism
Author(s):
Denis St-Martin
Université de Montréal
E: denis.saint-martin@umontreal.ca

21-07-2015
Systemic Corruption in an Advanced Welfare State:
Lessons from the Québec Charbonneau Inquiry 1

Denis Saint-Martin
Département de science politique
Université de Montréal

Forthcoming Osgoode Hall Law Journal

ABSTRACT: The Quiet Revolution in the 1960s propelled the province of Québec onto
the path of greater social justice and better government. But as the evidence exposed at
the Charbonneau inquiry makes clear, this did not make systemic corruption disappear
from the construction sector. Rather, it adapted to its new institutional environment and
was significantly shaped by the incentives structure it provided. The patterns of
corruption emerging from the Charbonneau inquiry bear the imprint of the so-called
“Québec model” inherited from the Quiet Revolution in at least three ways: (i) in the
economic nationalism that made public policies partial towards French-speaking and
Québec-based businesses, notably in the engineering sector, with major firms like SNCLavalin using their dominant position as “national champions” to engage in cartel-like
practices to raise the price of construction projects; (ii) in the Jacobinism that strongly
centralized power at the provincial level and left municipalities underdeveloped in terms
of bureaucratic capacity, thus making them easy prey for corrupted interests, and (iii) in
the sovereignist/federalist cleavage that, since the 1970s, has made Québec businesses
dependent on the Liberal Party for political stability and has allowed party operators to
extract a rent from businesses in return.
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The Charbonneau Commission, officially the Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management
of Public Contracts in the Construction Industry, is an ongoing public inquiry into potential corruption in
the management of public construction contracts. The Commission was created on 19 October 2011 by the
provincial Liberal government of Jean Charest, and is chaired by Justice France Charbonneau. The mandate
of the Commission is to: (1) examine the existence of schemes and, where appropriate, to paint a portrait of
activities involving collusion and corruption in the provision and management of public contracts in the
construction industry (including private organizations, government enterprises and municipalities) and to
include any links with the financing of political parties; (2) paint a picture of possible organized
crime infiltration in the construction industry; and (3) examine possible solutions and make
recommendations establishing measures to identify, reduce and prevent collusion and corruption in
awarding and managing public contracts in the construction industry. It is due to report in November 2015.
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INTRODUCTION
The Maclean’s controversy in 2010 over its front-page illustration of “Bonhomme
Carnaval” holding a suitcase overflowing with cash portraying Québec as “the most
corrupt” province in Canada, is a reminder of the role of culture in perceptions of
corruption. The affair ignited passionate debates at the time, leading to a unanimous
House of Commons motion denouncing the magazine for its “prejudice” and “denigration
of the Québec nation”. Pressure was such that the magazine’s parent company felt
compelled to express its “sincere regret for any offence that the cover may have caused”.
But the fact that the words “most corrupt” were first applied to Québec by Samuel
Huntington in his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, went largely
unnoticed. A quick look at his work would have revealed that debates about culture and
corruption have their origins in broader theoretical arguments in the social sciences
regarding the causes of political and economic development.
From his early contributions to later writings on the “clash of civilizations”, Huntington
was known for his “culturalist” position, treating culture as an explanatory variable to
show how cultural attitudes and beliefs hindered or enabled “progress”.2 Conceived as a
set of values and customs that purportedly distinguish one group from another, this
concept of culture was prominent in modernization theory.3 In the 1960s Almond and
Verba produced one of the most influential understandings of culture in terms of
“orientations toward the political system”, whereby some populations had “civic
cultures” while others did not.4 The West had a “participant” political culture and a
“parochial” culture was more widespread in the developing world.
In Canada, similar arguments informed the depiction of Québec’s political culture as
either “tribal”5 or “a case bordering on amoral familialism”6, a concept developed by
Banfield to account for the “backwardness” of a southern Italian village. 7 In a polemical
analysis of poverty in a small Italian village, Edward C. Banfield (a University of
Chicago political scientist who served as advisor to several Republican presidents)
proposed that strong kinship and family ties may induce an “amoral familism”, defined as
a social equilibrium in which people care exclusively about their immediate family,
exploit those outside the family, and expect everybody else to behave in the same
2

Jean Terrier, “Culture et types de l’action sociale” (2002) 40 Revue européenne des sciences sociales 141
at 153; Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science” (2002) 96 The
American Political Science Review 713 at 728.
3
Lucian W. Pye & Sidney Verba, eds. Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965); Ralph Heintzman, “The Political Culture of Quebec, 1840-1960” (1983) 16
Canadian Journal of Political Science 3 at 59.
4
Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
5
Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)
at 298.
6
Kenneth M. Gibbons, “The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada” in Kenneth M. Gibbons & Donald
Rowat, eds, Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1976) at 241.
7
Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).
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fashion. Banfield’s thesis provoked considerable debate about the nature of “familism”
and the role of culture generally in preventing or facilitating economic development8.
Among the other causes of corruption emphasized in culture-based approaches,
generalized trust, religion and acceptance of hierarchy play a crucial role.9 Societies that
cultivate secular-rational attitudes towards authority are perceived to be less corrupt than
those where “particularistic” values dominate.10 La Porta and his colleagues have argued
that the Protestant religion, being relatively less hierarchical when compared to other
churches and religions, is less prone to tolerate power abuses and corruption.11 More
hierarchical religions are said to encourage corruption because they discourage civic
engagement.12 Higher levels of corruption are reported in countries that have a
“collectivist” orientation13 and higher levels of “power distance”14, defined as the extent
to which members of society are willing to accept inequality.
Political culture accounts have (rightly) come under growing criticism for their
stereotyping of entire peoples and their tendencies toward cultural essentialism15. In these
accounts, culture is associated with communities typically defined by either geography,
nationhood, religion or race and ethnicity. Culture is portrayed as so deeply rooted, so
fixed, such a quintessential trait of a specific group that it almost seems like a “natural”
trait16. In recent years, scholars have paid greater attention to alternative conceptions of
8

G. A. Marselli, “American Sociologists and Italian Peasant Society” (1963) 3 Sociologia Ruralis 319 at
338; William Muraskin, “The Moral Basis of a Backward Sociologist” (1974) 79 American Journal of
Sociology 1484 at 1496; A. J. Wichers, “Amoral Familism Reconsidered” (1964) 4 Sociologia Ruralis 167
at 181.
9
Abigail Barr & Danila Serra, “Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis” (2010) 94 Journal of
Public Economics 862 at 869; Martin S. Lipset, Martin & Gabriel S. Lenz (2000). “Corruption, Culture and
Markets” in Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, eds, Culture Matters: How Values Shape
Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 112 at 124; Ahmed Seleim & Nick Bontis, “The
Relationship Between Culture and Corruption: A Cross-‐National Study” (2009) 10 Journal of Intellectual
Capital 165 at 184.
10

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Controlling Corruption Through Collective Action” (2013) 24 Journal of
Democracy 101 at 115; Bo Rothstein & David Torsello, “Bribery in Preindustrial Cultures: Understanding
the Universalism-Particularism Puzzle” (2014) 70 Journal of Anthropological Research 263 at 282.
11
Rafael La Porta, Florenco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Trust in Large
Organizations” (1997) 87 American Economic Review 333 at 338.
12

Leila Shadabi, “The Impact of Religion on Corruption” (2013) 12 The Journal of Business Inquiry 102
at 117.
13
Nina Mazar & Pankaj Aggarwal, “Greasing the Palm: Can Collectivism Promote Bribery?” (2011)
22 Psychological Science 843 at 848.
14

Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Beverly
Hills CA: SAGE Publications, 1984).
15

Viewing cultural traits as primordial qualities, likening them to biological or genetic factors, is known as
essentialism. Essentialists see culture as important and determinative, and at least semi primordial - that is,
so deeply rooted in history, religion, and social organization as to be highly resistant to both change and
variation. (e.g., studies of national characters and cultures). See Stephen Fuchs, Against Essentialism: A
Theory of Culture and Society (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
16
Jonathan Allen, “The New Culturalism of James C. Scott” (1999) 93 Theoria: A Journal of Social and
Political Theory 53 at 82; Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change” (1988) 82 The
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culture as “practices of meaning-making”.17 They have emphasized how people are not
born with a culture but into a culture that has to be created by humans and passed on to
future generations trough processes of socialization.18
Old culturalist habits die hard, however. They are still prevalent in anticorruption theory
and research, notably, as discussed next, around the concept of “systemic corruption”,
which emphasizes the informal and deeply embedded cultural beliefs and practices that
sustain corrupt exchanges and their reproduction over time. 19 I argue in the following
pages that “systemic corruption” provides a faulty conceptual foundation for building a
credible and generalizable theory of political and institutional change in anticorruption
research.
Systemic Corruption and the Challenge of Explaining Change
The Québec case poses an interesting challenge for anticorruption studies. While the
Maclean’s story clearly depicted an image of ubiquitous corruption, Canada’s other large
national print media outlet, the Globe & Mail, in an analysis of Québec’s welfare state
and its family-friendly policies, described the province as a “little Sweden of North
America”.20 Québec effectively ranks high on human development indexes21 and has
developed since the 1960s an independent bureaucracy organized along Weberian
principles that exercises considerable policy-making power.22 And yet testimonies at the
Charbonneau inquiry point toward strong evidence of systemic corruption at the
municipal level, in the engineering sector, in political financing, and in the quasimonopoly jointly operated by the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), the
province’s most powerful union, and a construction magnate who acknowledged having
had ties with the Montréal mafia.
How can this be? Systemic corruption is not typically associated with developed
countries and advanced welfare states, but with extreme cases, as in most of the postAmerican Political Science Review 789 at 804; Jens-Martin Eriksen, “When Culture Becomes Political
Ideology” (2013) 163 Telos 131 at 146.
17

Michèle Lamont, “Meaning-Making in Cultural Sociology” (2000) 29 Contemporary Sociology 602 at
607.
18
Tony Bennett & John Frow, eds, The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis (London: SAGE
Publications, 2008).
19
Roberto Laver, Systemic Corruption: Considering Culture in Second-Generation Reforms (Harvard
University, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 45, 2014).
20

Erin Anderssen & Kim Mackrael, “Better Daycare for 7$ /Day: One Province’s Solution for Canada”,
The Globe and Mail (18 October 2013) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>
21
Luc Godbout & Marcelin Joanis, “Vivre mieux…au Québec? Mesurer et comparer le bien-être à
l’échelle internationale” in Luc Godbout, Marcelin Joanis & Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin, eds, Le Québec
économique (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2011) 19 at 53.
22
James Iain Gow, Histoire de l’administration publique québécoise (Montréal : Presses de l’Université de
Montréal, 1986); Jacques Bourgault et Stéphane Dion, “Public sector ethics in Quebec: The contrasting
society” in John W. Langford and Allan Tupper, eds, Corruption, character, and conduct: essays on
Canadian government ethics (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 1994) 67 at 89.
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Soviet states for instance.23 How can the “little Sweden of North America” also be the
“most corrupt” province in Canada? This is the puzzle I address in this paper. I use the
Québec case and interpret the evidence exposed at the Charbonneau inquiry to build a
more robust model of institutional change in anticorruption studies. My key theoretical
point is that the shift of societies from a systemically corrupt social order to a non or less
corrupt one is not irreversible and never achieved definitively, as discontinuous models
of institutional change lead us to believe. Too often in corruption research scholars
explain change by pointing to exogenous shocks (e.g. wars, revolutions) that bring about
radical institutional reconfiguration. Enduring historical pathways are thus punctuated by
sudden and revolutionary moments of agency and choice.24 But thinking of change as
involving the “breakdown” of one set of institutions and its replacement with another
makes the analysis blind to the cyclical nature of corruption in societies.25 This is
especially the case in the construction sector, widely recognized as one of the most
systemically corrupt globally, in both the developed and developing worlds.26 Québec is
not alone in facing endemic corruption in the construction sector. Construction is a $3
trillion industry worldwide, and estimates of financial losses from corruption vary from
15 to 30 per cent per year.27 Construction projects are prone to corruption because of their
size, uniqueness and complexity, and the fact that projects are structured through various
phases and contractual links that disperse accountability among numerous separate
agents. Extensive approval processes and multiple layers of contractors afford the
greatest opportunities for corruption.28
Construction is always perceived as the most bribery-prone sector in political economies.
According to Ernst & Young’s 2012 Global Fraud Survey, “respondents from the
construction sector were more likely than average to see bribery as common practice in
their sector”.29 Corruption is endemic in construction because it is an anticipated practice
when contacts with public officials take place. The expectation of bribes orients behavior.
At the Charbonneau inquiry, an ex-construction boss said that, for years, three per cent of
all contracts he received from the city of Montréal went to the mayor’s party, and another
percentage point, known as “la taxe à Surprenant”, went to a city official. Such stability
(even familiarity) in the ties between corrupters and corruptees is indicative of what della
Porta and Vanucci describe as the “hidden order” of corruption, i.e. a set of self-enforced
23

Alena Ledeneva “Corruption in Postcommunist Societies in Europe: A Re-examination” (2009) 10
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 69 at 86.
24
Donatella della Porta & Alberto Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of
Political Corruption (New York: De Gruyter, 1999); Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention and
Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
25
Cristina Bicchieri & John Duffy, “Corruption Cycles” (1997) 45 Political Studies 477 at 495.
26
Jill Wells, “Corruption and Collusion in Construction: A View from the Industry” in Tina Søreide &
Aled Williams, eds, Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World Challenges (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 2013) 23 at 34.
27
John Hawkins, How to Note: How to Reduce Corruption Infrastructure Sectors (London: UK
Department for International Development, 2013) at 4.
28

Charles Kenny, Construction, Corruption, and Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2007) at 2.
29

Ernst & Young, 2012 Global Fraud Survey (London, 2012) at 3.
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and invisible codes, norms and reciprocity rules that help parties to corrupt exchanges
reduce uncertainties and the risk of defections or denunciations, and increase the
resources at their disposal.30 In the Netherlands - a country perceived to be among the
least corrupt in the world - a public inquiry in 2002 found substantial evidence of
collusion subsystems and networks in the construction industry.31 In the UK, a 2013
survey found that half of the 700 construction professionals interviewed believed that
corruption in construction was “extremely common”, and 40 per cent responded that they
had been offered a bribe on at least one occasion.32 Even in “squeaky clean” Sweden, a
report by the National Council for Crime Prevention found an “established culture of
corruption in the construction industry”.33 How can such a “culture” cohabit in a society
with otherwise fairly high levels of social trust and “quality of government”?
To explain this puzzle, the article proceeds as follows. The next section critically reviews
the concept of systemic corruption for its elasticity and limited applicability to advanced
welfare states, where corruption usually takes the form of “regulatory” or “institutional
capture”, and is found mostly at the subsystem level rather than the whole system level.34
In such contexts, the typical assumption in research that systemic corruption is deeply
embedded in culture and society and highly change-resistant needs to be relaxed.
“Embeddedness” expresses the notion that social actors can be understood and
interpreted only within relational, institutional and cultural contexts and cannot be seen as
atomized decision-makers maximizing their own utilities.35 In this article, I try to develop
a more appropriate middle ground between the functionalist, “oversocialized” view of
systemic corruption, where social conditions exist a priori to behaviours, and norms and
values are deeply internalized; and the utilitarian, “undersocialized”, neoclassical position
of the principal-agent in anticorruption research and policy, according to which behavior
transcends social contexts.36
To illustrate this argument, in the second section I take a short step back to the 1960s to
describe how the Quiet Revolution propelled the province of Québec onto the path of
30

Donatella della Porta & Alberto Vannucci, The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011).
31
Grat Van Den Heuvel, “The Parliamentary Inquiry on Fraud in the Dutch Construction Industry:
Collusion as Concept between Corruption and State-Corporate Crime” (2005) 44, Crime, Law & Social
Change 133 at 151.
32
The Chartered Institute of Building, A Report Exploring Corruption in the UK Construction Industry
(London, September 2013) at 3.
33
Linda Hols Salén & Lars Korsell, Reported Corruption in Sweden: Structure, Risk Factors and
Countermeasures (Stockholm: Brå - Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2013) at 73.
34

Jonathan Hopkin & Andrés Rodriguez-Pose, “Grabbing Hand or Helping Hand? Corruption and the
Economic Role of the State” (2007) 20 Governance 187 at 208; Mark Warren, “What Does Corruption
Mean in a Democracy?” (2004) 48 American Journal of Political Science 328 at 343.
35
Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness” (1985) 91
American Journal of Sociology 481 at 510. See also Mark Granovetter, “The Social Construction of
Corruption”, in Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg, eds, On Capitalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2007) 152 at 172.
36

For a similar “middle ground” position, see Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in
Africa?” (1999) 37 The Journal of Modern African Studies 25 at 52.
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greater social justice and better government. Québec has built what is arguably the
strongest model of social protection in North America.37 It has developed a distinctive
European-like welfare state that includes universal childcare, active labour market
policies, and a government-wide strategy against poverty and social exclusion. But as the
evidence exposed at the Charbonneau inquiry makes clear, the political “big bang”
created by the Quiet Revolution did not make systemic corruption disappear from the
construction sector. Rather, it adapted to its new institutional environment and was
significantly shaped by the incentives structure it provided. As we shall see in the third
section, the patterns of corruption emerging from the Charbonneau inquiry bear the
imprint of the so-called “Québec model” inherited from the Quiet Revolution in at least
three ways: (i) in the economic nationalism that made public policies partial towards
French-speaking and Québec-based businesses, notably in the engineering sector, with
major firms like SNC-Lavalin using their dominant position as “national champions” to
engage in cartel-like practices to raise the price of construction projects; (ii) in the
Jacobinism that strongly centralized power at the provincial level and left municipalities
underdeveloped in terms of bureaucratic capacity, thus making them easy prey for
corrupted interests, and (iii) in the sovereignist/federalist cleavage that, since the 1970s,
has made Québec businesses dependent on the Liberal Party for political stability and has
allowed party operators to extract a rent from businesses in return. I conclude the article
by summarizing my arguments and spelling out alternative theoretical and policy
implications for the future fight against corruption.
1. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS IN CORRUPTION THEORY
AND RESEARCH
When Huntington wrote in 1968 that Québec was “perhaps” (a term omitted in the
Maclean’s article) the “most corrupt”, he was comparing the “Belle Province” to
Australia, Britain, Canada and the US. His argument was that Québec voting behavior
remained traditional and not as class-based as in the other four jurisdictions. Rather than
making choices based on programmatic and universalist appeals, Québec voters choose a
particularistic form of politics based on religion, ethnicity and language.38
This understanding of culture as universalist/particularist was prominent in
modernization theories: the notion that the development of societies worldwide would, in
the long run, follow the path of Western modernization in establishing liberal
democracies and market capitalism.39 Corruption, in this perspective, comes from the
“clash” of indigenous values and the norms of modern bureaucracy. Values stressing
traditional obligations to family, tribe or village - believed to be prevalent in developing

37

Keith Banting & John Myles, eds, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2014).
38

Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) at 65.
Samuel Huntington, “Modernization and Corruption” in Arthur J. Heidenheimer, ed, Political
Corruption. Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1970) 492 at 500.
39
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countries - are seen as undermining formal legal and political institutions40. Corruption,
in this view, “is in large part an expression of particularism – the felt obligation to help,
to give resources to persons to whom one has a personal obligation, to the family above
all but also to friends and membership groups”.41
In functionalist theory, corruption is considered a sign of friction between various
subsystems, and in particular, of the survival of old values and traditional institutions
during periods of rapid social and economic transformation. Corruption is said to play a
number of positive functions. Sociologists like Huntington and James C. Scott argued in
the 1960s that high levels of corruption, though at first sight being the exact opposite of a
modern social structure, can play an important function in the modernization of societies
in the developing parts of the word.42 Their argument was that political corruption can,
among other things, serve as an incentive for people to join political parties beyond
traditional ties like family, ethnicity, or religion. Furthermore, political corruption was
seen as an antidote to bureaucratic red tape and a mean to “grease the wheels of economic
growth”.43 Arguments emphasizing the functionality or problem-solving quality of
corruption were first developed by Merton, who contended that corruption, in the form of
the “political machine”, fulfilled certain social needs not addressed by the formal political
system at the turn of the 20th century in the US.44 At a time when the administrative
capacity of the state was low, and the legal order was not rigorously enforced, the
political machine played a vital role in maintaining order amid the rapid social changes
brought about by industrialization and urbanization. By allowing the urban poor, ethnic
minorities and newly arrived immigrant groups access to resources; and by granting
business elites privileges and guarantees, the political machine effectively managed the
disparate and conflicting interests of civil society during the great economic and social
transformation of America.
Following Merton, others emphasized the role of patronage in facilitating political
integration in culturally and linguistically diverse societies.45 The interpretation of
corruption as the price to pay to keep recalcitrant provinces like Québec and
Newfoundland quiet and the country together has long been at the centre of the brokerage

40

Gabriel Ben-Dor “Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development” (1974) 7 Comparative
Political Studies 63 at 83; Joseph S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis” (1967) 61 American Political Science Review 417 at 427.
41
Martin S. Lipset, Martin & Gabriel S. Lenz (2000). “Corruption, Culture and Markets” in Lawrence E.
Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington, eds, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York:
Basic Books, 2000) at 119.
42
James C. Scott “An Essay on the Political Functions of Corruption” (1967) 5 Asian Studies 501 at 523.
43
Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” (1964) 8 American
Behavioral Scientist at 10.
44
45

Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1957).

James C. Scott “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change” (1969) 63 American Political
Science Review 1142 at 1158.
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theory of party development and elite accommodation in Canada.46 To quote from Jeffrey
Simpson’s Spoils of Power,
Patronage, by offering the benefits to people of all regions, has helped to
steer Canada away from parties based on race, religion or region, which
would have led to unstable coalition governments. Patronage, whatever
its costs, has done its bit for national integration and political stability.47
In contemporary debates, this line of argumentation defending corruption for its positive
effects on modernization is almost forgotten. Today, the study of corruption is, by and
large, dominated by “new institutional economics” and political science, both
contributing to the consensus that treats corruption basically as a “social disease”.48 This
shift in research is usually interpreted as a rational learning process moving from mere
functionalist speculation to economic models and survey data demonstrating that
corruption has no positive developmental aspects whatsoever.49 The functionalist
prevision that developing nations would follow the more efficient path of the developed
world, where corruption has become marginal or residual over time, has largely been
proved wrong. Whereas the persistence of corruption in developing countries used to be
seen as the exception, and its relative absence or weakness in the West as the historical
norm, today most researchers take the opposite view. They start from the premise that all
human societies are corrupted. The crucial difference is that some have been more
successful than others in developing stronger institutions to deter corruption and reduce
the costs it imposes on societies.50 In the “new institutional economics”, government
institutions and policies are no longer the causes of corruption and poor performance.51
Classical economists and theories of rent-seeking have traditionally viewed big
government as the source of big corruption.52 But research in the 1990s began to stress
that quality - not quantity - was the key issue when it came to government and

46

Kenneth R. Carty, “Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of the Development of National
Politics” In Hugh G. Thorburn & Alan Whitehorn, eds, Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: Prentice Hall,
2001) 16 at 32; Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1973).
47
Jeffrey Simpson, Spoils of Power: The Politics of Patronage (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1988) at 16.
48
Johann G. Lambsdorff, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences, and
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
49

Pranab Bardhan, “The Economist’s Approach to the Problem of Corruption” (2006) 34 World
Development 341 at 348.
50

Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
51

Jean-Cartier Bresson, Économie politique de la corruption et de la gouvernance (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2008).
52
Rajeev K. Goel & Michael L. Nelson, “Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis”
(1998) 97 Public Choice 107 at 210; Johann G. Lambsdorff,”Corruption and Rent-Seeking” (2002) 113
Public Choice 97 at 125.
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corruption.53 Renewed attention was paid to Weberian bureaucratic structures and their
role in nurturing growth.54
As political economists became more interested in institutions, they highlighted their
propensities toward path dependency and lock-in processes.55 Contrary to the efficiency
view of institutions in economic analysis, they found that competitive pressures did not
lead to the elimination of inefficient institutions and their convergence toward a common
“best way”. Since then, the “big question”, in Douglass North’s words, is “why aren’t all
countries in the world advanced industrialized nations?”56 Why aren’t we all
Scandinavians? Why dysfunctional institutions are so difficult to change?
Systemic Corruption as an Informal Institution
North’s response is that analysts have placed too much emphasis on the effects of formal
institutions while neglecting the equally important role of informal ones. In recent years,
new conceptions of systemic corruption as a dysfunctional informal institution consisting
of a series of collective action dilemmas (social traps) have emerged.57 These approaches
emphasize the role of social norms and cultural beliefs as coordinating devices or
mechanisms that sustain particular equilibria. They tend to break down the conceptual
divide between “institutions” and “culture”. They take a more sociological view of
institutions.58 Informal institutions are defined broadly to include the “socially shared
rules”, symbol systems, cognitive scripts and frames that guide human action.59 Systemic
corruption, in this perspective, is a “system where the need to offer and demand bribes in
order to maintain what are deemed the necessary services or economic standard is
ingrained in most agents’ “mental maps” – so much so that this has become an informal
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institution” .60 The institution of systemic corruption is informal insofar as it is neither
explicitly codified nor externally enforced. Nevertheless, it powerfully shapes the
interests and strategies of public officials and citizens. Corruption becomes so pervasive
and routine when systemic that agents are no longer aware of it. They come to “interpret
life in terms of corruption”, to quote from a United Nations report on Bosnia and
Herzegovina.61
Definitions of systemic corruption as an informal institution are a welcome addition to
the analyst’s toolkit. They remind us that the self-reproducing properties of institutions
are very often cognitive in nature. But they describe an all-encompassing form of
corruption that leaves little room for human agency. And they refer to extreme cases that
are supposed to represent the exception rather than the rule. According to various
estimates, approximately 40 to 50 countries (out of a total of almost 200) around the
world suffer from systemic corruption, ranging from all of the post-Soviet countries to
places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and much of sub-Saharan Africa. Systemic corruption
is not typically associated with developed countries and advanced welfare states. In
anticorruption studies, the theory is that these countries were once systematically corrupt,
but broke free from corruption in a revolutionary moment of abrupt and wholesale
transformation. Bo Rothstein calls this the “big bang approach” to change, which
suggests that societies cannot escape the “social trap” of systemic corruption gradually,
but only through “dramatic”, radical reconfigurations.62
The big question then becomes how systemically corrupt social orders make the
transition to a non or less corrupt one? One important obstacle stands in the way of
understanding this transition, however. The shift, or “big bang”, must first begin in the
systematically corrupt order and should therefore be consistent with its logic. If that is
true how does the transition get started? If systemic corruption is an informal institution
that involves cognitive templates or “mental maps” that individuals unconsciously enact,
then actors in such a system presumably do not think about leaving or changing it. It is, in
fact, this very taken-for-grantedness that makes systemic corruption self-enforcing and so
difficult to combat. As a concept, systemic corruption ends up like culturalist theories,
incapable of dealing adequately with political change.63 By emphasizing the homogeneity
and consistency of groups’ beliefs and values, notions of systemic corruption
overestimate the problem of collective action and the immovability of corrupt
arrangements. The equilibrium sustaining systemic corruption is seen as so deeply rooted
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in culture and society that it is almost impossible to alter through institutions and
policies64. It can only be disembedded by radical change. As Larry Diamond has argued,
Endemic corruption is not some flaw that can be corrected with a
technical fix or a political push. It is the way the system works, and it is
deeply embedded in the norms of and expectations of political and social
life. Reducing it to a less destructive level - and keeping it there requires revolutionary change in institutions.65
The problem with revolutionary models of change, however, is that they exaggerate the
rupture between past and present. They pay insufficient attention to the adaptive nature of
systemic corruption and are ill-equipped to explain its persistence in advanced welfare
states66. As the evidence presented at the Charbonneau inquiry reveals, systemic
corruption in construction did not go away with the dramatic advances in “quality of
government” and social equality that followed the Quiet Revolution. Rather, corrupt
actors and networks adjusted to new institutions and the incentives structure they
provided. Formal institutions may not have the power to eliminate corruption, but they
provide the structure of incentives that helps define the costs and benefits of participation
in corrupt exchanges. In the Québec case, much of that “structure” was laid down in the
1960s in a set of institutions and policies that together, because of their complementarity,
came to be known as the “Québec model” of development.67 The next section describes
the basic parameters of this model and the following one discusses how it shaped the
patterns of corruption exposed at the Charbonneau inquiry.
2. THE QUÉBEC MODEL AND THE PATH TO SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
BETTER GOVERNMENT
The term “Quiet Revolution” refers to a short period of intense changes in the first half of
the 1960s corresponding to the tenure of office of the Liberal Party of Jean Lesage and
characterized by the secularization of society, the creation of a modern welfare state and
mixed economy, and major reforms to curb corruption in political financing and the
public services. Until 1960, the province of Québec had been dominated by the
conservative Union Nationale of Maurice Duplessis who ruled from 1936 to 1939 and
64
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again from 1944 to 1959. Duplessis presided over a period of Québec’s political
development marked by widespread corruption and dubious electoral practices, described
as the “Great Darkness”.68 Duplessis was known as “the Boss” (le chef), and as is typical
of “bossism”, he maintained a system of political authority and loyalty centered on him
personally and bound together by patronage, coercion and self-interest69. Duplessis’s
death in 1959 caused the Union Nationale to lose its hold on power in the 1960 election.
The new Liberal government embarked upon a massive program of reforms. It attacked
political patronage and changed the electoral map to provide for better representation. It
limited expenditures during elections. The period was marked by the dramatic
development of government institutions. From 1960 to 1970, the province’s expenditures
grew fivefold, from $860 million to $5 billion dollars. As a Table 1 below indicates, this
period also saw significant growth in the size of the public sector.70
Table 1: Growth in the Size of Québec’s Public Sector
Year

Administration

Public Enterprises

Total

1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985

22, 262
29, 298
41, 847
53, 700
85, 465
102, 750
108 ,503

6, 044
7, 460
14, 411
16, 366
27, 047
32, 326
41, 830

28, 302
36, 766
56, 258
70, 066
112, 512
135 ,076
150, 333

Employees per 1, 000
Citizens
6.2
7.14
9.94
11.65
18.2
21.4
22.8

The Lesage government acted on three major fronts: economic, social and political. On
the economic front, the government first priority was increasing French-speaking
Quebecers’ control over the province’s economy. Although francophones made up 80 per
cent of Québec’s population, only 47 per cent of businesses were owned by French
Quebeckers. The goal here was to redress the underrepresentation of French Canadians in
the upper echelons of Quebec’s economic structures. This was to be achieved through
state-owned enterprises, most notably the nationalization of electricity production and
distribution. In 1963, Natural Resources Minister René Levesque nationalized all of the
electrical utilities to form Hydro-Québec, which remains a leading successful public68
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sector corporation to this day. The creation of Hydro-Québec opened new opportunities
for French-speaking professionals in managerial and technical positions.
Hydro-Québec established French as the sole working language in the new enterprise and
gave preferential purchasing treatment to Quebec-based businesses. The so-called
“megaprojects” embarked upon under Hydro-Québec’s mandate, largely massive new
dam projects in the province’s remote north, were instrumental in propelling Québec
engineering into the major leagues and led to the emergence of world-class engineering
firms such as SNC-Lavalin. Another major achievement was the creation in 1965 of a
government-controlled fund that administers the assets of the Québec Pension Plan. The
fund rapidly grew to several billion dollars and provided a strong tool to support the
economy by allowing the state to invest in key sectors. The Société Générale de
Financement was also established to hold retirement savings and to pool money for
investment in corporations owned by Quebeckers. A third institution, the Caisse de dépôt
et placement, manages pension fund revenues and pools them for additional investment
in the province and in francophone businesses.
On the social front, the provincial government took over the fields of education, health
and welfare which had been in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church since the
beginning of New France. It centralized power in newly created ministries of Health and
Education, and church-related institutions came increasingly under the control of
provincial bureaucracies. The public service was modernized and allowed to unionize and
expand. This greatly expanded civil service gradually took on the character of an
independent bureaucracy – organized according to bureaucratic principles, requiring
professional qualifications for appointment and promotion, and exercising considerable
policy-making power. In fact, by the mid-1960s, there was a widespread popular
sentiment that Québec had become a technocracy in which senior bureaucrats - and not
politicians - were the dominant force.71
On the political front, the pursuit of a more activist role by the Québec government soon
led to federal-provincial conflicts. Québec’s demands for wider jurisdictional powers
challenged the established procedures of Canadian federalism. Growing federalprovincial quarrels raised the question of the place of Québec and French Canadians in
Confederation. In 1965, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism noted
that “Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest
crisis in its history. The source of the crisis lies in the Province of Quebec”. French
Canadian nationalism was becoming more and more Québécois in nature. Québec’s
increasing power and search for autonomy met resistance from Ottawa. This was most
visibly the case in the diplomatic area. Leaders of the Quiet Revolution like Lévesque
concluded that the federal system would not permit the Quebec state to assume the role it
had come to expect and that only independence would make this possible. The Parti
Québécois (PQ) was created in 1968 with the goal of transforming the province into a
sovereign state. This led to a major realignment of politics into federalist and sovereignist
camps, one that still prevail today.
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The Quiet Revolution’s Effects
The “consuming goal” of the Quiet Revolution, according to McRoberts, was
“rattrapage, catching up to social and economic development elsewhere”.72 The primary
aim of reformists was to eliminate the long-standing and crippling inequality trap created
by the enduring economic disparities between French and English in Canada. Until the
1960s, francophones in Quebec earned less than anglophones. Has the economic position
of francophones improved in the last 50 years? Unequivocally yes. There are two
dimensions to consider: business ownership and relative earnings. On the first point,
Table 2 below shows that francophone-owned businesses in Québec increased their share
of provincial employment from 51 per cent in 1961 to 67 per cent in 2003.73
Table 2: Ownership of Quebec Economy

Public Sector
1961
1978
1991
2003
All Sectors
1961
1978
1991
2003

ForeignOwned
Employers

AnglophoneOwned Employers

FrancophoneOwned Employers

0.5
0
0
0

47.7
32.8
34.8
38.3

51.8
67.2
65.2
61.7

13.6
13.9
8.7
10

39.3
31.2
26.2
22.9

47.1
54.8
65.1
67.1

On the second point, research by Pierre Fortin indicates that Québec francophones’
earnings in 2000 were equal to or greater than earnings of anglophones of the same
gender, language skills, level of education, number of years of experience and number of
weeks worked.74 This is a far cry from the 52 per cent wage gap between French-origin
and British-origin men in Québec in 1960. When Lesage came to power, two thirds of
young adults in Québec did not have high school diplomas. Table 3 indicates that
Québec’s average level of schooling was more than a year under the national average 50
years ago; by 2001 it had closed the gap.
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Table 3: Average Years of Schooling for Population Aged 25-34
Region

1961

2001

Quebec

9.5

14.4

Change
(Percent)
4.9

Ontario

11

14.7

3.7

10.7

14.3

3.6

All Other Provinces

“Increasing the welfare and health of our population” was another stated objective of the
Lesage government. To achieve this goal Quebec built an imposing welfare state. Figure
1 compares public spending in Québec with spending in 20 selected OECD countries in
2009.75 Public spending in Québec accounts for 47 per cent of GD. It ranks fourth, not far
behind Denmark (49 per cent) and Sweden (48 per cent) and tied with France and Italy.
Public spending accounts for a larger share of Québec’s GDP than for Finland,
Netherlands and Norway.

Figure 1: Public Spending as Percentage of GDP

How well is Québec’s welfare state performing? The province has arguably become the
most egalitarian society in North America. Whether in absolute or relative terms, there is
generally less poverty in Québec than elsewhere in Canada and the United States. Figure
2 shows this comparison between Québec and the 20 selected OECD countries for 2010.
75
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Figure 2: Inequality in Selected OECD Countries
and Québec After Income Tax and Transfer (2010)

In 2010 the richest households in Québec had an average income 4.7 times higher than
the poorest households. When we compare this level of inequality with that in the 20
selected OECD countries, Québec falls in the middle of the ranking. Scandinavian
countries and the Netherlands have less inequality than Québec. The income gap between
the wealthiest and the poorest households is wider in Québec than in the Netherlands
(4.3), Sweden (4.0), Norway (3.7), Finland (3.7) and Denmark (3.6). At the other end of
the ranking, a number of OECD countries, almost all known for their governments’
generally more limited intervention, have greater inequality than Québec, including
Canada as a whole. This is also the case for Ireland (5.4), the United Kingdom (5.6),
Australia (5.7) and Japan (6.2). The United States has by far the greatest inequality rate.
Unlike its immediately neighbouring jurisdictions, Québec has less inequality and is
closer to more egalitarian countries.
Social Partnership in a Small Society
The Quiet Revolution’s goals have been broadly achieved. But this relative success was
not the result of the state acting alone. And neither was it immediate, but gradual. The
model that emerged from the Quiet Revolution was étatiste, centralized and top-down. In
the 1970s, the social forces and coalitions that had wrought the interventionist state began
to crack and break apart. Social movements, unions and advocates of decentralization
started to criticize the technocratic management of public services.76 Economic
restructuring and the recession of the 1980s highlighted the limits of state-led
development strategies. In the 1980s and 1990s, the province began to experiment with
more collaborative forms of governance. It organized “economic summits” where all the
players in the economy and civil society were brought together and asked to work with
the government to build unity around key objectives. Québec’s welfare state entered at
that moment a second phase, with a new wave of social programs such as universal drug
76
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insurance, low-fee childcare, extended parental leaves, new family allowances and pay
equity.77 It evolved into “a new model of solidarity-based democratic development
anchored in new relationships between the state, the market and a vigorous and
autonomous third sector”.78
Québec’s response to changing economic circumstances was a variant of the “democratic
corporatism” of small societies described by Katzenstein.79 In Europe, Katzenstein
argued that perceived vulnerability (economic or otherwise) generated an ideology of
social partnership that acted as the glue for the “democratic corporatist” politics and
institutions found in small states. Small nations are said to have more social cohesion and
greater ability to make sacrifices for the common good. They can coordinate policy in
ways that help them respond successfully to external vulnerabilities by building
institutional capacities for cooperation, flexible maneuvering, and concerted action in the
“national interest”.80 Political centralization also tends to be greater and political
arrangements tend to be more closely knit. In the “varieties of capitalism” literature,
small neo-corporatist societies belong to the “coordinated market economy” type.81
According to Peter Hall, coordination and cooperation is facilitated in small political
economies by “a thick set of shared understandings of the sort built up by experience
over long periods of time, tantamount to a particular ‘culture’ rooted in national
history”.82 In the Québec case, the modernizing and resolutely secular nationalism of the
Quiet Revolution provided the critical foundation for the ideology of social partnership
that Katzenstein suggested was crucial for small societies. A shared sense of national
identity allowed partners to limit internal conflicts, overcome collective action problems
and coordinate on a specific equilibrium.
With more than 40 per cent of the province’s workers being unionized (Figure 3 next
page) - the highest rate in North America - social partnership in Québec is characterized
by the presence of powerful trade unions.83 Union might is matched by a well-organized
business community represented by a peak association, the Conseil du patronat. Other
partners include a solid women’s movement and a dense network of social and
community organizations active in the social economy. Thanks to patient capital provided
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by workers’ investment funds such the Solidarity Fund set up by the Fédération des
travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ), social economy enterprises have flourished
over the past 20 years.84 The Solidarity Fund supports job creation in Québec’s small and
medium-sized businesses. It is funded by retirement savings subscriptions from union
members and the general public, and benefits from tax credits by the provincial and
federal governments85. The Fund and its counterpart (FondAction) established in 1996 by
the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), the second largest union organization
in the province, have invested over $12 billion in Quebec companies and helped create or
maintain 200,000 jobs in the province. The two funds are partners, either directly or
through their network members, in over 3,000 Québec businesses and social economy
enterprises.86

Figure 3: Total Unionization Rate as a
Percent of Employment (2004)
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Workers’ investment funds engage unions directly in socio-economic initiatives with
government and business.87 This illustrates how social partnership blurs the boundaries
between state and market and between the public and private sectors. It transforms
private economic actors into public policy-makers with whom the government shares part
of its authority. Private organized interests are granted a representational monopoly and
privileged access to the policy-making process. They are equipped with public power and
have a voice at the decision table in return for their adherence to commonly agreed goals.
Definitions of corruption as the “abuse of public power for private ends” rely “on the
superficial clarity of a public-private distinction”.88 They imply a sharp distinction
between market and state not found in neo-corporatist political economies, where private
interests assume quasi-public functions. As we shall see next, when former FTQ
president Michel Arsenault contacted premier Charest to complain about the Chinese
taking a piece of the Québec construction market, he said he was not defending the
private interests of the Accurso group, the largest employer in the industry, but rather the
interest of the Québec economy as a whole.
3. PATTERNS OF SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION AND THE LEGACIES OF PAST
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The Charbonneau Commission’s budget (around $35 million) and legal standing have
produced background investigative research and a comprehensive set of hearings where
participants were legally compelled to testify under oath. The Commission has heard
nearly 200 witnesses over a period of two and a half years. Its work was broadcasted
daily and its proceedings were widely followed on TV and debated in the press.
Witnesses included public officials, former and sitting politicians, party fundraisers,
union bosses, engineers and construction company representatives. Written transcripts of
their testimonies are available on the Commission’s website and consist of approximately
9,000 pages of documents.
In this section I explore this material and the narratives of first-party participants in
corrupt exchanges to paint a picture of systemic corruption in public contracts for
construction projects at the municipal level of government89. This is admittedly a highly
interpretive and inductive enterprise, but inherent to the theory-building objective of this
paper. The goal is to develop a theoretical explanation from the testimonies given at the
Charbonneau inquiry to infer that a more general causal mechanism is at work in the
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study of this particular case. This mechanism emphasizes the structuring effects of the
Québec social model on the patterns of corruption exposed at the Charbonneau inquiry.
To recapitulate, my key theoretical claim is that discontinuous models of institutional
change are ill-equipped to explain the persistence of systemic corruption in advanced
welfare states. In Québec, the “big bang” created by the Quiet Revolution did not
eliminate systemic corruption in construction - a problem that exists in all market
economies. Rather, corrupt practices adapted to new institutional arrangements and were
shaped by the incentives structures they provided. I use a process-tracing method to
identify “traces” of the Québec model in the accounts of direct participants in networks of
corrupt exchanges.90 I expect patterns of systemic corruption to parallel (i.e. to be
embedded in) the overarching institutional structures of the political economy. As
discussed next, the patterns of corruption emerging from the Charbonneau inquiry bear
the imprints of the governing arrangements inherited from the Quiet Revolution in at
least three ways: (i) in the economic nationalism that made public policies partial
towards French-speaking and Québec-based businesses, notably in the engineering
sector, with major firms like SNC-Lavalin using their dominant position as “national
champions” to engage in cartel-like practices to raise the price of construction projects;
(ii) in the Jacobinism that strongly centralized power at the provincial level and left
municipalities underdeveloped in terms of bureaucratic capacity, thus making them easy
prey for corrupt interests, and (iii) in the sovereignist/federalist cleavage that, since the
1970s, has made Québec businesses dependent on the Liberal Party for stability and has
allowed party fundraisers to extract a rent from businesses in exchange.
The Engineering Sector as a National Champion
The Lesage government’s nationalization of electricity and Hydro-Québec’s subsequent
development of hydropower megaprojects in the province’s north in the 1970s played a
key role in creating French-language engineering firms. Hydro-electric development
projects, beginning with Manic V, and a few years later the James Bay project, were
instrumental in propelling Québec engineering into the major leagues. Lavalin’s
participation in the projects allowed it to grow to a position of global dominance,
eventually becoming one of the five largest engineering firms in the world, with 28,000
employees worldwide. From the outset, Hydro-Québec adopted a policy of preferential
purchasing from French-speaking enterprises, paying up to 10 per cent more for locally
produced items. This policy resulted over time in tens of billions in public contracting,
leading to the development of several francophone corporations capable of competing in
world markets, including SNC-Lavalin, Dessau-Soprin, Roche, and Génivar, “initially
developed as a result of Hydro-Québec contracts”.91 These firms became national
champions and symbols of “Québec Inc”; the francophone business elite brought by
state-owned enterprises such as Hydro-Québec, la Caisse de dépôt et de placements and
the Société générale de financement (SGF).
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Quebec-based engineering firms recorded revenues of $5 billion and employed more than
23,000 people in 2013.92 Mergers and acquisitions have made the industry more
concentrated over time; from more than 100 firms 20 years ago to about 40 today.
According to the Québec Department of Economic and Regional Development, the
industry has become an “oligopoly”.93 This concentration is reflected in the Department
of Transport’s expenditures for external expertise and technical services. As Figure 4
shows, from 1997 to 2012, 12 engineering firms accounted for 87 percent ($2.5 billion)
of the funds spent by the department for professional services contracts.94

Figure 4: Firms Obtaining Most of the Department of Transport’s
Contracts for Engineering Services

Collusion most often takes place within the market structure of oligopoly.95 The firms
identified in Figure 4 have all admitted to participating in a collusion scheme to raise the
price of construction projects. A former Genivar executive told the Charbonneau inquiry
that he was part of a cartel of engineering firms that “shared the pie” on Montréal public
works contracts in the mid-2000s - rigging bids in concert with Montréal’s then-ruling
Union Montréal party in exchange for political donations. An engineer from Génius
testified that he was asked to act as the industry “spokesperson” in the decision-making
process in which firms were to become eligible for lucrative city contracts. He worked
with Union Montréal’s treasurer (who had a list of forthcoming projects) to choose
contractors from a pool of firms which were in on the bid-rigging scheme and put
forward their offers to the municipal selection committee. The winning firm would
usually come in at four or five per cent under scale, he said. Had actually competed, firms
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could have been forced to bid as much as 25 per cent under scale, he told the
Commission.
The bid-rigging system that plagued the construction industry in the Montreal area
extended to other cities, big and small, across the province. An engineer at AECOM
(formerly Tecsult) said that in 2003, he was told by company officials in Laval - where a
similar system long existed - that his firm and three others had agreed to split up contracts
worth between $25,000 and $500,000 in the city of Gatineau. According to the deal, the
contracts would go to Cima+ (40 per cent), Genivar (27 per cent), Tecsult (22 per cent)
and Dessau (11 per cent). The four firms designed a system to split public-works
contracts in Gatineau between 2003 and 2009. At first, members of the cartel
communicated in person, the inquiry was told, but they later started to divide contracts
during phone meetings, using an elaborate code to communicate their prices before
submitting their bids. A winner was selected and the others sent in higher bids,
replicating a system that first appeared in the greater Montréal area and which the
Commission exposed during the hearings.
Construction magnate Tony Accurso’s name came up numerous times when the inquiry
focused on the system of collusion among companies bidding for Montréal contracts. At
their peak, Accurso’s firms employed some 3,500 people and did annual business worth
$1.2 billion. His vast network of companies was built through his friendships with highranking union officials and the backing of the province’s largest, labour-controlled
investment fund. Accurso said at the inquiry that he chose to do business with the
Solidarity Fund because he wanted to keep investment in Québec and not send it “to
Toronto”. The construction magnate described himself as a patriotic man eager to help
Québec’s economy. Accurso admitted that four FTQ presidents had gone for trips on his
luxury yacht, “The Touch” (including Louis Laberge, Henri Masse, Clement Godbout
and Michel Arsenault). A wiretap conversation played at the Charbonneau inquiry
highlighted the tight links uniting the FTQ and the Accurso group. When Accurso called
Arsenault to complain about outsiders from China winning lucrative engineering
contracts for major Québec infrastructure projects, the FTQ president sprang into action.
He immediately contacted politicians in power, including in a January 2009 conversation
with then-premier Jean Charest which was caught on a police wiretap. The former union
boss (he retired in November 2013) has been relentlessly questioned by the inquiry’s
attorney about the organization’s influence and how much sway Accurso had on the
union. Arsenault admitted to intervening with the government on Accurso’s behalf
regarding certain Hydro-Québec related projects. But in the case illustrated by the
inquiry, he denied that he was being used by Accurso. He insisted his intervention
following Accurso’s complaint about outsiders winning an engineering contract was
purely in the interest of defending the best interests of the Québec economy and its
workers. After Accurso’s call, Arsenault was heard speaking to Charest in a short phone
exchange, during which he told the ex-premier that partners of the union’s investment
fund wer unhappy about rumblings of a foreigner obtaining the contract. A few days after
the conversation with Charest, Arsenault reported back to Accurso, saying Charest had
“turned white like a snowbank when I told him about the Chinese getting the contract.”
Arsenault also said he’d spoken to then-opposition leader Pauline Marois and a host of
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ministers including former Treasury Board president Monique-Jérôme Forget. Arsenault
admitted on the stand that there was an interest in pushing for Accurso’s company to
succeed. The union’s billion-dollar Solidarity Fund has heavily invested in Accurso’s
companies and wanted to see him get lucrative contracts. Arsenault has repeatedly stated
he didn’t see any conflict of interest issues. “Inside the construction industry, it was well
known that Tony [Accurso] was synonymous with the Fund,” one witness said.
The Underdeveloped Nature of Local Public Administrations
Testimonies at the Commission have depicted an image of endemic corruption in local
public administrations. The mayors of Québec’s two largest cities, Montréal and Laval,
resigned over corruption scandals. Laval mayor Gilles Vaillancourt was arrested in May
2013 at his home by the police and charged with “gangsterism”. The inquiry also heard
about so-called “turn-key” elections conducted in the suburbs and in smaller
municipalities. “Turn-key” elections involve companies, such as engineering firms,
providing everything required and candidates simply stepping into privately financed
campaign operations. The company or other business interest takes over a mayoral
candidate’s campaign; it rents the headquarters, hires workers and maps strategies. If its
candidate wins, the mayor is then expected to reward his/her hidden corporate sponsor
with public contracts after the election. One witness estimated that he had organized up to
60 election campaigns while working at Roche engineering. Over time, the rigging of
election campaigns became a normal business practice. Organizers were placed on
corporate payrolls. In exchange for their election-fixing services, their private sector
paymasters got the inside track on lucrative municipal contracts.
“Turn-key” elections constitute an obvious form of “institutional capture”.96 Low voter
turnouts and the relative absence of electoral competition in Québec municipal politics
might explain why they appear to have been common at the local level. Voter turnout
averages 40-45 per cent in municipal elections, compared to 70-75 per cent in provincial
and federal elections. The trend is similar for the rest of Canada.97 In Montréal in 2013,
only 43 per cent of eligible voters participated, despite widespread corruption scandals.
Fewer people vote and as a result, a majority of mayors and local politicians in Québec
(55 percent) are elected without opposition. A study by Champagne of the 2005
municipal election has found that political competition for the mayor’s job declines with
municipalities’ size.98 In municipalities with 1000-1999 inhabitants, 75 percent of mayors
are elected without opposition. Low turnover rates among elected municipal officials
favour continuity and stability in political leadership and in relationships with private
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contractors. This increases the risk of corruption because incumbents face no competitors
to expose their potential misuse of office.99
Most people do not vote in municipal elections because they do not perceive the
significance of local government in their lives. Municipalities in Canada live in the
shadow of federalism, which gives preeminence to provincial-federal relations.100 Local
governments are weak. Compared to other advanced industrial countries, municipalities’
constitutional and jurisdictional power is limited.101 Constitutionally, local authorities are
a competence of the provincial governments; hence the well-worn phrase that they are
“creatures of the provinces.” Provincial governments create them, regulate them,
prescribe many of the policies they implement, and, not infrequently, eliminate them
through amalgamation. Not surprisingly, municipalities’ financial position is also
relatively weak. Spending by local governments makes up only 4.1 per cent of Canadian
GDP, while the 2009 average for the 29 OECD countries for which data is available was
12.2 per cent.102
In Québec, the central role played by the provincial state in the promotion of the
francophone majority since the Quiet Revolution, has reinforced the political
subordination of municipalities. Distributional conflicts and ongoing rivalries with the
federal government make the provincial bureaucracy more jealous of its power and less
intent on sharing it. Municipalities are micro-managed from the provincial capital by the
powerful ministry of municipal affairs. A study by Belley, Bherer et al. concluded that
“Québec municipalities have not experienced a real increase in their powers over the past
years…they have neither the institutional depth nor the fiscal and political power of that
characterize many of their counterparts in the advanced industrial countries”.103
In the 1960s, reformers focused their energies on developing a Weberian bureaucracy at
the provincial level. Province-building accompanied the process of nation-building. The
Québec state was to be the leader, innovator and symbol of Québécois identity. Not much
attention was paid to local government. The merit system in municipal public services
remains weakly institutionalized.104 Montreal, the city with the oldest administrations in
the province, is regularly decried by its own public service commission for making
appointments outside the formal merit-system. Local public services have low
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organizational capacities. Resources are scarce and they have few in-house skills or
capabilities, relying extensively on outside expertise. The Charbonneau inquiry has
revealed the extent of this dependence in the case of municipal engineers. Witnesses have
described engineering firms acting as subcontractors to local governments as a “parallel”
or “shadow” public service. These private companies are insulated from government
hiring rules and immune from access-to-information laws. A growing shift of personnel
from government to engineering firms (and vice versa) in recent years points toward the
development of a “revolving door” between the public and private sectors.105 For years,
the Québec Lobbying Commissioner has been suspicious of, and often chastised,
engineering firms for failing to disclose their contacts with government officials.106
This lack of transparency has provided fertile ground for the growth of corrupt practices.
Engineers have refused to view their work as lobbying. They see themselves as
professionals who provide technical advice on infrastructure projects. But testimonies
suggest that the image of the neutral and disinterested expert might have served to hide
improper contracting practices and the tactic of charging “extras” for fake cost overruns.
Problems arise when municipal administrations are dependent on private sector suppliers
and do not have the internal know-how to verify contractors’ work. This results in private
suppliers raising their prices and in public agencies becoming hostages to subcontractors’ demands.
Business’ Dependence on the Liberal Party for Political Stability
The election of the PQ in 1976 brought strong negative reactions from the Canadian and
Québec corporate sectors. Pierre Desmarais II, the then president of the Conseil du
Patronat (CPQ), said that he would act as “leader of the opposition” to the Lévesque
government. Fearing the instability that a rupture with Canada would engender, the
Québec business community has always been “massively federalist”.107 French speaking
businesses have been a consistent and staunch supporter of federalism. From the
beginning, they have viewed independence as a threat to their access to the wider
continental market and as a “possible catalyst to economic deterioration within the
province”.108 The CPQ in particular has been critical of the sovereignist project,
commissioning special studies on its likely economic costs and dismissing it as “sheer
emotionalism”.
In a gesture of high symbolic resonance, the Sun Life Insurance Co., established in
Montréal since the 19th century, moved its head office to Toronto after the PQ
government came to power and passed a new law that made French the official language
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of the workplace in Québec. Big business was not on the PQ’s side, and the PQ retaliated
by making business donations to parties illegal. The introduction of a law banning
corporate donations and imposing a ceiling on individual contributions to the province’s
parties was one of the PQ’s first acts in office in 1977 (Bill 2, which came right after Bill
1, also known as Bill 101, the language law). At the time of its unanimous adoption by
the National Assembly, Bill 2 was the first legislation of its kind in Canada. Lévesque
wanted to reduce the influence of corporate money on Québec politics. Businesses and
interest groups could no longer use their money to manipulate power. Only citizens
would be allowed to contribute to parties. In return, the government would compensate
for the reduced financing entailed by these measures by making allocations to political
parties.
According to Graham Fraser, “The reform that Lévesque cherished the most was the
election-financing legislation, Bill 2. Indeed, he expressed more emotion about political
fund-raising than about anything else”.109 What Fraser termed the “old slush-fund
tradition” was part of Québec’s political folklore; donations were secret and were quietly
repaid with government contracts. This was one of the reasons for the Liberal
government’s unsavoury reputation. Bill 2 reflected the PQ belief that corporate
donations were a major cause of corruption in Quebec. It was intended to sever the link
between corporate wealth and political parties.
With Bill 2, Lévesque also wanted to create a level playing field for his sovereignist
party. In Québec, big business is strongly federalist. “Without a ban on corporate
donations the ‘Yes’ camp would have been reduced to countering the federalist
referendum artillery with sticks and stones”, writes Chantal Hébert.110 The draft electionfinancing law was initially strongly opposed by the Liberals and the Chamber of
Commerce as a restriction on freedom of opinion and expression. The 1977 law has since
been emulated in numerous jurisdictions, including at the federal level, where donations
can no longer come from companies and must be less than $1,000 per person. But a
retired executive at the Roche engineering firm reported at the inquiry that the landmark
Québec election-financing law that inspired similar reforms across Canada has been
systematically flouted since its inception. He said that within three years of the PQinitiated political reforms of the late 1970s, unscrupulous fundraisers were already
circumventing them. He estimated that less than 10 per cent of funds collected at the
municipal level, and 20 per cent at the provincial level, actually came from legal eligible
donors. As for the rest, corporate money quickly breached the barricade set up by the
1977 law. He said it was easy to find people to pose as donors because they would get
reimbursed and receive the added bonus of a tax credit. “A few years later – I’d say two
or three years later - the law was being outsmarted”, he told the inquiry. “The director
general of elections didn’t check and it was easy to find strawmen because of the tax
credit. Everyone called me because it was essentially a $300 gift”.
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Between 1998 and 2009, Accurso and his employees illegally donated up more than half
million to the Liberal party. “Never ask a politician to help you, just not to hurt you”, he
recounted in his testimony to the Commission. “I never ran after anyone to give them
money. When the demands came in, we did what we had to do”. Commission lawyer
Sonia LeBel presented a picture of Accurso embracing former premier Jean Charest at a
fundraiser held at his Laval restaurant in 2001. The entrepreneur explained that he offered
up his restaurant and supplied the food and drinks. The picture is signed by Mr. Charest,
who wrote: “Thanks for your support”111. Accurso detailed his donations to politicians
over the years, saying he felt it was the best way to ensure that government officials
would not block or delay his projects. “No one makes a $3,000 cheque out of
conviction”, he told the inquiry. “I was afraid of the possibility of reprisals from
politicians”. Figures compiled by the Commission show that between 2002 and 2008,
Accurso and his employees made donations ranging from $50,000 to $90,000 a year to
the Québec Liberal Party. From 1998 to 2009, the donations totalled $556,000.
A senior SNC-Lavalin vice-president told the Commission that his firm arranged for its
employees to donate hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal donations to the Liberal
Party each year during the 2000s. Portions of a sealed police affidavit released by a
Québec Court judge revealed that two former SNC-Lavalin vice-presidents, each told
police that their job included the unofficial responsibility of monitoring and arranging for
political financing.112 The men said that former SNC-Lavalin CEO Jacques Lamarre
informed them of this responsibility, and that they had been in contact with a senior
Liberal fundraiser to arrange for donations to the party. SNC-Lavalin employees acted as
straw donors and the company reimbursed them.
Numbers released by the Commission show that even in their legal financial
contributions, engineering firms have a strong bias toward the Liberal Party. As Figure 5
indicates, the twelve firms that obtained most of the Department of Transport’s contracts
for engineering services (87 per cent or $2.5 billion) donated 14.8$ million between 1998
and 2011. Firms gave much more to the Liberals (56 per cent) than to the PQ (36 per
cent). A similar preferential treatment is found in the political donations of the largest
construction companies. Sixty-five per cent of the $2.3 million they gave to parties
between 1998 and 2011 went to the Liberals. It is true that the Liberals receive more
because they have been in power for a longer period of time. But even when the PQ is in
power (1998-2003), it does not receive anywhere near the amount that the PLQ gets
when it forms the government.
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Figure 5: Political Contributions by Engineering Firms Obtaining
Most of the Department of Transport’s Contracts

Such a pattern contradicts an important body of work on “business pragmatism”
suggesting that corporations tend to split their contributions 50-50 between the two major
parties in two-party systems.113 In Canada for instance, the major banks and large
corporate donors give equal amounts to the Liberals and Conservatives.114But in Québec
business is not as uniformly generous toward the two governing parties. Firms are more
politically connected to the Liberal Party.
One specific advantage brought to firms by this connection is stability against the risks of
secession brought by the PQ. As economists have emphasized, politicians will often be
tempted to extract at least some of the rents generated by connections.115 One hypothesis
derived from this work would be that the PQ’s rise to power in the 1970s has made
Québec business more dependent on the Liberals for political and economic stability.
This, in turn, would have allowed party operators to extract a rent from business in the
form of preferential funding.
CONCLUSION
This paper has stressed the embeddedness of corruption in the overarching institutional
structures of the political economy. I used the Québec case to develop an alternative to
discontinuous models of institutional change and to suggest a more appropriate middle
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ground between the functionalist, “oversocialized” view of systemic corruption, and the
“undersocialized”, neoclassical position of the principal-agent in anticorruption research
and policy, according to which behavior transcends contexts.
The shift of societies from a systemically corrupt social order to a less corrupt one is
never achieved once and for all, as “big bang” models of change lead us to believe.
Revolutionary models of change pay insufficient attention to the adaptive nature of
systemic corruption and are ill-equipped to explain its persistence in advanced welfare
states. New institutions to improve the “quality of government” created in episodes of
political “big bang” may help deter corruption only in the sort-time. But there is ample
evidence to believe that the long-run impacts could be quite different. For example, it
could take corrupt officials time to learn how to manipulate a new system, so the long-run
effects of an anti-corruption policy could be smaller than the short-run effects.116
As the evidence presented at the Charbonneau inquiry reveals, in Québec systemic
corruption in construction was not fully disembedded from society and the economy by
the dramatic institutional changes toward establishing better government that took place
at the time of the Quiet Revolution. But neither was it so deeply embedded that it
remained impervious to its changing formal institutional environment. Anticorruption
research too often assumes that formal institutions and rules are overtaken or superseded
by the informal institution of systemic corruption117. Such a position is reminiscent of
society-centric and rational-design analyses that downplay the autonomous role of state
institutions and public policies and that focus only on their intended effects.
Formal institutions may not have the power to root out systemic corruption from society,
but this does not mean that they have no effect on it. Rather, they provide the structure of
incentives that helps define the costs and benefits of participation in corrupt exchanges.
They leave their own imprint on patterns of corruption.
Different “varieties of capitalism” produce different patterns of corruption. Québec is
characterized by a coordinated market economy (CME) and testimonies at the
Charbonneau inquiry have highlighted the extensive involvement of key socio-economic
partners in corrupt exchanges. The Québec model of development entrusted private
economic actors with quasi-public functions. Citizens’ outrage over the violation of this
public trust may encourage politicians to combat corruption by reducing the size of
government. But in the Québec case, this would be like “throwing the baby out with the
bathwater”. The quality of government is the problem, not its quantity.
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